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ABSTRACT
With the rapid proliferation and increased sophistication of ma-
licious software (malware), detection methods no longer rely only
onmanually generated signatures but have also incorporatedmore
general approaches likeMachine Learning (ML) detection. Although
powerful for conviction of malicious artifacts, these methods do
not produce any further information about the type of malware
that has been detected. In this work, we address the information
gap between ML and signature-based detection methods by intro-
ducing an ML-based tagging model that generates human inter-
pretable semantic descriptions of malicious software (e.g. file in-
fector, coin miner), and argue that for less prevalent malware cam-
paigns these provide potentially more useful and flexible informa-
tion than malware family names. For this, we first introduce a
method for deriving high-level descriptions of malware files from
an ensemble of vendor family names. Then we formalize the prob-
lem of malware description as a tagging problem and propose a
joint embedding deep neural network architecture that can learn
to characterize portable executable (PE) files based on static anal-
ysis, thus not requiring a dynamic trace to identify behaviors at
deployment time.
We empirically demonstrate that when evaluated against tags
extracted from an ensemble of anti-virus detection names, the pro-
posed tagging model correctly identifies more than 93.7% of eleven
possible tag descriptions for a given sample, at a deployable false
positive rate (FPR) of 1% per tag. Furthermore, we show that when
evaluating this model against ground truth tags derived from the
results of dynamic analysis, it correctly predicts 93.5% of the la-
bels for a given sample. These results suggest that an ML tagging
model can be effectively deployed alongside a detection model for
malware description.
1 INTRODUCTION
Whenever one or more malicious files are found in a computer
network, the first step towards remediation is to understand the
nature of the attack in progress. Knowing the malicious capabili-
ties associated with each suspicious file gives important context to
network defenders which helps them define and prioritize counter-
measures.
Generally, anti-virus (AV) or anti-malware solutions provide a
detection name when they alert about potentially harmful files de-
tected in a machine as a way to provide this context. These de-
tection names usually come from specific signatures written by
reverse engineers to identify particular threats, therefore encod-
ing expert knowledge about a given malware sample. While this is
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theoretically useful for categorizing known malware variants, dif-
fering malware naming conventions among vendors have led to
detection names that are inconsistent and highly vendor-specific
[16, 20]. For example, Worm.Ludbaruma.B and Win32.Worm.VB.k,
are detection names produced by two different vendors for the
same sample. The problem of inconsistent naming conventions
has been compounded due to more feature-rich malware and in-
creased quantities of malware over time. Moreover, some detection
names serve only as unique identifiers and do not provide action-
able information about what type of harm the malicious sample
could do if it infects a system (e.g. Gen:Variant.Razy.260309 or Tro-
jan (005153df1)).
When a novel malware variant appears, applying existing de-
tection names is even more problematic, since current rule-based
signatures will likely not trigger on these variants at all. Machine
learning (ML)malware detectors have the potential to identify these
new malware samples as malicious, but generally do not provide
further information about the type of malware encountered.
In this paper, with existing detection naming issues in mind,
we introduce our novel SMART (Semantic Malware Attribute Rel-
evance Tagging) approach. In contradistinction to prior malware
(family) detection names, the semantic malware attribute tags that
SMART detection uses yield human interpretable, high level de-
scriptions of the capabilities of a given malware sample. They can
convey different types of information such as purpose (‘crypto-
miner’, ‘dropper’), malware family (‘ransomware’), and file char-
acteristics (‘packed’). SMART tags are related to malware family
names in the sense that they attempt to describe how a piece of ma-
licious software executes and the intent behind it. However, unlike
malware family names, SMART tags are non-exclusive, meaning
that one malware campaign (or family) can be associated with mul-
tiple tags and a given tag can be associated with multiple malware
families. This formulation allows indexing malware by semantic
similarity in terms of type of malicious content, and opens the door
to novel applications, e.g., natural language search queries in an
endpoint detection and response (EDR) product, prioritization of
events based on malicious content, and similarity indexing of new
unseen samples, among others.
The number of tags is also inherently bounded by types of mali-
cious behavior and chosen granularity in description. Thus, a fixed
number of tags can roughly describe all malicious samples, even
when the number of malware families increases dramatically. Be-
cause of this fact, the SMART approach to malware description
makes the task suitable to be addressed with machine learning
methods.
SMART tags also serve as a common ground to integrate knowl-
edge frommultiple sources or detection technologies since they do
not presume standard naming conventions. For the experiments
in this paper, we derive these tags by leveraging the underlying
knowledge encoded in detection names frommultiple anti-malware
vendors in the industry, and from behavioral traces of files’ execu-
tion, but the general framework applies whenever we have differ-
ent analyses of the same file.
Using our derived SMART tags, we then train a multi-label deep
neural network to automatically predict tags for new (unseen) files
in real time, and only assuming access to their raw binary represen-
tations. We find that our network yields impressive performance
on the tag prediction task.
The primary contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose a simple annotation method to extract malware
tags based on AV detection names.
(2) We further introduce the task ofmalware tag prediction and
formalize it under the framework of multi-label learning.
(3) We empirically demonstrate that it is feasible to learn be-
havioral characteristics of malicious software samples from
a static representation of the file by fitting a deep neural
network to predict the proposed set of tags and evaluating
the results on ground truth tags extracted from behavioral
traces of files’ execution.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section
2 we discuss existing approaches to malware description, particu-
larly family names and hierarchies and review attempts to estab-
lish industry-wide standard naming conventions. We also discuss
related research in the machine learning for information security
(ML-Sec) space as well as similar applications in other domains,
such as image tagging, music information retrieval, and semantic
facial attribute recognition. In Section 3, we define the concept of
describing malware with semantic tags, and present two methods
for deriving SMART tags from binary executable files, one by ag-
gregating detection names from multiple vendors in the industry
and a second one by exploiting behavioral information from run-
ning the files in a virtual environment. We then formalize the prob-
lem of malware characterization as a tagging problem in Section 4,
and propose two neural network architectures for tag prediction.
In Section 5, we train several neural networks and evaluate their
performance on the tagging task both on noisy tags extracted from
detection names and on ground-truth tags extracted from dynamic
analysis of the files. We analyze our results and their ramifications
in Section 7, and present conclusions and propose directions for
future research in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we revisit the idea of malware description by us-
ing family classification, review the concept of attribute tagging in
other domains, and survey related machine learning approaches in
the field of machine learning for information security (ML-Sec).
2.1 Malware Family Categorization
Identifying the family and variant of a particular malicious sample
can provide important intelligence to the end user, administrator
or security operator of a system about what type of attack might
be underway. This extra contextual information can help define
a remediation procedure and evaluate the severity and potential
consequences of the attack. In fact, numerous vendors provide in
their websites detailed information about popular family/variant
information, with associated description of what that variant does,
and suggest how a particular piece of malware can be removed.
Without such identifying information, we are left only with the of-
fending file itself as its own description. Unless some reverse engi-
neering effort is taken, which can be costly, it is difficult to discern
much about the internals of the file.
The idea to identify all malware under a consistent family nam-
ing scheme across multiple vendors has been around for decades.
It first came to the attention of the security community in the
early 1990’s and prompted the Computer Antivirus Research Or-
ganization (CARO) to propose a first naming convention in 1991
[2], which was was later extended to add coverage for new kinds
of malicious software such as backdoors, trojans, joke programs
and droppers, among others [1].
The threat landscape has changed dramatically since the intro-
duction of the CARO standard nearly 30 years ago. The quantity
of new malware samples that security vendors’ labs receive has
increased dramatically, to millions per month. Some of these sam-
ples are variations of previously knownmalware, while others take
code from older campaigns and re-purpose it for new tasks. Yet still
others, are entirely novel types of malware. In this scenario it be-
comes practically unfeasible to manually and consistently group
each malicious file into a well defined hierarchy of families. Even
the arguably simpler task of assigning a malware file into an exist-
ing family has also becomemuch harder, as malware becamemore
resistant to signature-focused detection, thanks to advanced obfus-
cationmeasures such as polymorphism/metamorphism, (repeated)
packing and obfuscation, recompilation, and self-updating [29].
The increasing quantities of malware samples and the resilience
to signature methods caused the security community to start us-
ing more flexible analytic tools than signatures designed only to
identify a single malware variant [12], and increasingly rely on
dynamic analysis and more generic signatures when possible [13].
While generic signatures offer an advantage for malware convic-
tion, the nature of this approach makes it more difficult to orga-
nize malware names into families. Moreover, the quantities of ma-
licious files to be analyzed lead to less structured categorizations
and greater inconsistencies between vendors. The number of anti-
malware vendors with varying detection strategies also grown con-
siderably thus compounding the problem. In particular, modern se-
curity vendor detection names typically fall into one of four cate-
gories, containing varying amount of information about the threat
family to which a malware sample belongs.
- Traditional family based. Names are associated with unique and
distinctive attributes of the malware and its variants. Malware
classified under these names usually have a larger amount of
original source code or a novel exploit mechanism and often
come from the same origins. This not only gives it a distinctive
attribute that can aid in the classification, but also requires re-
searchers to put forth more effort to analyze it’s inner-workings.
These types of detection names will often be of high-quality and
have more consistency across vendors.
Today, these types of detection names are most often seen in
parasitic file-infectors and specific bot nets campaigns with dis-
tinctive attributes, e.g. Virut, Sality, Conficker, etc. These types
2
of names usually use a suffix to identify specific variants, which
often denotes a revision to the malware or change in the config-
uration data for use in a different campaign. E.g. Mal/Sality-D.
- Technique based. These type of detection names group together
malware that may come from different origins and/or have mul-
tiple authors but share a common method or technique. For ex-
ample, many executable autorun worms have been written in
the past using languages languages like Visual Basic 6 or AutoIt
that change explorer’s file and folder view settings to hide file-
name extensions and employ an icon resource similar to that of a
popular document format. Due to the relatively low complexity
of the infection method many amateurs copied this technique
resulting in a large amount of similar malware that was not nec-
essarily of the same origin.
Some anti-malware solutions would generically detect and clas-
sify many of these malware samples under the same generic
family name, where other vendors may have have defined dif-
ferent more specific criteria for each family classification based
on other attributes of the payload. When a generic family name
provided by the AV vendor, they oftentimes replace the detec-
tion name suffix with a partial hash of the file data in order to
identify a specific sample. The difference in detection methods
employed often results in less consistency in the technique based
detection names across vendors. E.g. Troj/AutoIt-CHN.
- Method based. This type of detection name simply denotes the
detection technology used to detect the malware sample. Some
detection names can simply be that of a patented technology,
project, or internal code name specific to the AV vendor, indicat-
ing the use of heuristics, ML, or real-time detection technologies
like cloud look-ups. In these cases the detection name is not that
of a malware family, but that of the method that was utilized to
detect the sample. E.g. Unsafe.AI_Score_64%.
- Kit based. AV vendors will often use more generic family names
for detecting malware that has been generated by a known kit.
These kits are often referred to as grey hat tools, as they can
be used both offensively by penetration testing teams and by
malware authors. Many of these kits obfuscate their payloads in
attempt to circumvent detection by AV software. These kits do
not often require as much skill to use, and as a result the num-
ber of malware authors able to employ these methods is large,
making kit generated malware more prevalent in the wild. De-
tection names in this category tend to not describe the origins or
functionality of the specific malicious payload, but instead iden-
tify methods used by the kit or tool to obfuscate or hide their
payload. E.g. Trojan:Win32/Meterpreter.gen!C.
In [36],Marcos et al. identified a number of naming inconsistencies
across cybersecurity vendors, and proposed an approach that uses
data-mining techniques to distill family names for malware sam-
ples by combining detection names frommultiple anti-malware so-
lutions. Complementary to this work, [24] proposed an automated
technique which relies on individual detection names from multi-
ple vendors, for evaluating the quality of a given malware cluster-
ing. In this paper we also combine detection names from multiple
vendors, but instead of trying to fit each new sample to a nam-
ing scheme withmutually exclusive hierarchical categories such as
families, we propose an alternate approach to describing the func-
tionality and the relationship between malicious samples by using
attribute tags. A set of attribute tags describes a piece of malware
through easy to interpret properties, and can be thought of as a
soft-family classification, since it describes the sample and relates
it with other samples described with the same (or an overlapping)
set of tags. The advantage of the SMART tags approach is that it
does not presume a partition on the malware space by genealogy,
while providing potentially more useful information about a mal-
ware sample.
The idea of describing malware through a set of descriptive at-
tributes instead of using malware families is not new: The MITRE
corporation developed the Malware Attribute Enumeration and
Characterization (MAEC) Effort [18], a standardized language for
attribute-basedmalware characterization, in version 5.0 at the time
of writing. This structured language aims to encode information
about malware based upon an extensive list of attributes such as
behaviours, capabilities, artifacts, and relationships between mal-
ware samples, among others. For the purpose of this work and be-
cause of budgetary considerations relatedwith dataset labeling, we
choose to work with a reduced, independently defined set of tags.
Nevertheless the techniques explored would apply to a more broad
attribute definition.
2.2 Semantic Attribute Tagging
Semantic attribute tagging refers to the association of sampleswith
key-words that convey various types of high-level information about
their content. These tags can later be used to interpret or summa-
rize the content of the sample, for information retrieval in a large
database of samples or for clustering, among others. In the last
decade the use of tags has become a popular method for organiz-
ing and describing digital information. Content platforms use tags
for images, video, audio, news articles, blog posts, and even ques-
tions in question-answering forums.
Automatic content tagging algorithms attempt to annotate data
by learning the relationships between the tags and the content. Be-
cause any given sample can be related to multiple tags, this task
can be, and usually is, framed as a multi-label prediction prob-
lem within the field of machine learning. Automatic image [4, 8–
10, 39, 41] and audio [5, 6, 22] tagging are among the most pop-
ular areas of research in automatic attribute tag prediction today.
State of the art text, image and audio tagging algorithms use deep
learning techniques which require massive datasets of tagged sam-
ples to train on. These datasets are often generated collaboratively
(either directly or indirectly), meaning that multiple sources anno-
tate some part of the dataset independently of each other. As noted
by Choi et al. in [5], this way of obtaining labeled information is
a noisy process which has to be accounted for in the design and
evaluation of the learning algorithm. Particularly Choi et al. study
the effect of noisy labels when training deep neural networks in
the multi-label classification setup, particularly when the noise is
skewed towards the negative labels.
Semantic attribute tagging has two important characteristics
worth considering: i) first, it can convey a lot of identifying in-
formation about a sample, even if the the sample is novel. Facial
3
attribute tagging [19, 27, 28, 31, 35, 40], for example, has repeat-
edly demonstrated that vectors of attribute predictions (e.g., gen-
der, hair color, ethnicity, etc.) fromone ormore classifiers can them-
selves be powerful feature vector representations for face recogni-
tion and verification algorithms; ii) secondly, semantic tags can be
stored, structured, and retrieved in a human interpretable manner
[35]. Both of these characteristics are appealing in a commercial
computer security use case where the type of the threat can be
roughly identified by a description that makes sense to security
researchers and end users.
2.3 Multi-Label Classification
We briefly mentioned in Section 2.2 that semantic attribute tagging
relies on multi-label classification, wherein we aim to predict mul-
tiple labels simultaneously. There are several ways to do this, the
most trivial of which is to learn one classifier per label. This naive
approach is not efficient in the sense that one classifier does not
benefit from what the other classifiers have learned about a given
sample. Furthermore, it can be unfeasible from a deployment per-
spective, particularly as the number of labels grow. For correlated
labels, a popular approach is to use a single classifier with multi-
ple outputs, one per output label. The total loss for the classifier
is obtained by adding together the loss terms across the model’s
outputs during training and optimizing over a multi-objective loss.
Not only does this yield a more compact representation but it also
improves classification performance over using independent clas-
sifiers [31]. We use as our baseline architecture a multi-label deep
neural network architecture in Sec. 4 which exploits a shared rep-
resentation of the input samples, and has multiple binary cross en-
tropy loss functions atop stacks of hidden layers, or heads, with
final sigmoid outputs – one per tag.
An alternative approach to multi-label classification, first intro-
duced in the image tagging and retrieval literature, is to learn a
compact shared vector space representation to which map both
input samples and labels – a joint embedding [4, 8, 9, 11, 39, 41] –
where similar content across modalities (images and tags for image
tagging) are projected into similar vectors in the same low dimen-
sional space. At query time, a similarity comparison between vec-
tors in this learned latent space is performed, e.g., via inner prod-
uct, to determine likely labels. A variety of models could be em-
ployed to form a joint embedding, but crucially, the embedding is
optimized across input modalities/labels. In Section 4 we present
a joint embedding model that maps SMART tags and executable
files into the same low dimensional Euclidean space for the mal-
ware description problem.
2.4 Malware Analysis with Neural Networks
In recent years multiple advances in machine learning for infor-
mation security (ML-Sec) have taken place. This can be attributed
to several factors including an explosion in labeled data available
from vendor aggregation services and threat intelligence feeds, and
more powerful hardware and software frameworks for fitting highly
expressive classifiers, along with a need of the cyber-security in-
dustry to incorporate more flexible methods to improve their de-
tection pipelines. In this work we focus particularly on analysis
over Windows Portable Executable (PE) files based on static fea-
tures, i.e. information that can be extracted from the binary files
without having to run them.
In contrast to our work which focuses on malware description,
most modern applications of deep learning have focused on mal-
ware detection. Saxe et al. [33] applied deep neural network detec-
tion to feature vectors derived from 2-dimensional histogram sta-
tistics of PE files along with hashed delimited strings and hashed
elements from the file header, including metadata and import ta-
bles. Further applications of deep learning exploiting similar fea-
ture sets have been used to categorize web content [34], office doc-
uments [32], and archive formats [32]. Other types of features and
classifiers have also been used for the task of PEmalware detection.
For instance, Raff et al. demonstrated in [26] a way to effectively
identify malware using solely an embedding of the first 300 bytes
from the PE header. In later work, Raff et al. proposed an embed-
ding strategy which takes in the entire PE file [25] for the same
problem. In [3], Bugra and Erdogan use a disassembler to retrieve
the opcodes of the executable files and then a shallow network
based on word2vec [21] to embed them into a continuous vector
space. Afterwards, they train a gradient search algorithm based on
Gradient Boosting Machines for the malware classification task.
The two approaches that are most related to our work are the
works conducted by Huang et al. in [14] which uses the auxiliary
task of predicting family detection names with the goal of improv-
ing the performance on their detection model, and by Rudd et al.
in [30], work that is contemporaneous to ours, where the authors
study the impact of using multiple auxiliary loss terms on a mul-
titude of tasks, in parallel to the main binary detection task and
conclude that using these auxiliary information during training is
beneficial for the performance on the main task. Note, however,
that the purposes of the auxiliary losses in these works were to im-
prove performance on the main malicious/benign detection task.
3 SEMANTIC MALWARE ATTRIBUTE TAGS
We define a semantic malware attribute tag (which we will also re-
fer to as amalicious ormalware tag for short) as a potentially infor-
mative, high-level attribute of malicious or potentially unwanted
software. These tags are loosely related to malware families, in the
sense that they attempt to describe how a piece of malicious soft-
ware executes and the intent behind it, but they do so in amore gen-
eral and flexible way. One malware campaign (or family) can be as-
sociated with more than one tag, and a given tag is associated with
multiple families. For the purpose of this study, and without loss of
generality, we define a set T , with |T | = 11 different tags of inter-
est that we can use to describe malicious PE files: adware, crypto-
miner, downloader, dropper, file-infector, flooder, installer, packed,
ransomware, spyware, and worm. We chose this particular set of
tags so that we can generate concise descriptions for most com-
mon malware currently found in the wild. The definitions for each
of the tags can be found in Appendix A.
Since malware tags are defined at a higher level of abstraction
than malware families, we can bypass the problem of not having a
common naming strategy for malicious software, and thus exploit
the knowledge contained in multiple genealogies generated from
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different sources in a quasi-independent manner: detection tech-
nologies, methodologies, etc. It becomes irrelevant if one source
identifies a sample as being part of theQakbot familywhile another
calls it Banking Trojan so long as we have a way to associate those
two correctly with the spyware1 tag. Furthermore, some sources
might have stronger detection rules for certain kinds of malware.
In the remainder of this sectionwe propose three labeling strate-
gies used to generate tags for a given set of files: i) one that com-
bines the information encoded in the detection names of several
anti-malware solutions and then translates them into semantic tags;
ii) an extension to the previous labeling strategy that exploits co-
occurrence information on these detection names to improve the
stability and coverage of the tags; and iii) an dynamic approach
based on a behavioral analysis of the files’ execution to detect pop-
ular malware families with high confidence. In later sections we
will use these labeled sets for both training and evaluation of deep
neural networks (DNNs) to annotate previously unseen samples in
real time, by looking only at their binary representation.
3.1 Tag Distillation from Detection Names
High quality tags formalware samples at the scale required to train
deep learning models can be prohibitively expensive to create man-
ually. Instead, we rely on semi-automatic strategies that are nois-
ier than manual labeling but allow us to label millions of files that
can then be used to train our classifiers. For training purposes, we
propose a labeling function that annotates PE files using the pre-
viously defined set of tags by combining information contained
in detection names from multiple vendors 2. In this work we use
names from nine anti-malware solutions that are known to pro-
duce high quality detection names. The labeling process consists
of two main stages: token extraction and token to tag mapping. Ex-
ample outputs of each intermediate stage of the tag distillation are
represented in Table 1. We later extend this procedure to improve
tagging stability and coverage by exploiting statistical properties
of detection names.
3.1.1 Token Extraction. The first step for deriving tags from detec-
tion names is parsing the individual detection names to extract rel-
evant tokens within these names. A token is defined as a sequence
of characters in the detection name, delimited by punctuation, spe-
cial characters or case transitions from lowercase to uppercase (we
create tokens both splitting and not splitting on case transitions).
These are then normalized to lowercase. For example, from the
detection name Win32.PolyRansom.k we extract the set of tokens
{win32, polyransom, poly, ransom, k}. Once all the tokens from all
the vendor detection names for a given training dataset are created,
we keep those tokens that appear in a fraction of samples larger
than α in our dataset. In practice we set the threshold α to 0.06%.
A manual inspection of the remaining tokens found that they were
mostly non-informative pseudo-random strings of characters usu-
ally present in detection names (e.g. ‘31e49711’, ‘3004dbe01’).
3.1.2 Token to Tag Mapping. Once the most common tokens were
defined, we manually built an association rule from tokens to tags
1Qakbot in particular also exhibits the behavior of a worm and could be therefore also
tagged as such.
2Vendor names were anonymized throughout this work to avoid inappropriate
comparisons.
for those tokens relatedwithwell-knownmalware family names or
those that could be easily associated with one or more of our tags.
For example, nabucur is the family name of a type of ransomware
and therefore can be associated with that tag. Similarly, the token
xmrig, even though it is not the name of a family of malware can be
recognized as referring to a crypto-currency mining software and
therefore can be associatedwith the crytpo-miner tag. This way, we
created a mapping from tokens to tags based on prior knowledge.
With this mapping, we can now associate a sample with a tag if
any of the tokens that map to that tag are present in any of the
detection names given by the set of trusted vendors.
3.1.3 Token Relationship Mining. In order to understand how to-
kens relate to each other, we compute the empirical token condi-
tional probability matrix K,
K(i, j) = p˜(ki |kj ) = #(ki ∩ kj )/#kj , (1)
where #kj is the number of times the token kj appears in a given
dataset, and #(ki ∩ kj ) is the number of times ki and kj occur to-
gether. K(i, j) is then, by definition, the empirical conditional prob-
ability of token i given token j for a given dataset of samples. We
then define the following pairwise relationships between tokens
based on their empirical conditional probabilities:
• Tokens ki and kj are synonyms under threshold β if and only if
p˜(ki |kj ) > β and p˜(kj |ki ) > β .
• Token ki is a parent of token kj under threshold β if and only if
p˜(ki |kj ) > β and p˜(kj |ki ) ≤ β .
• Tokenki is a child ofkj under threshold β if and only if p˜(ki |kj ) ≤
β and p˜(kj |ki ) > β .
With this in mind, we extend our previously proposed labeling
function as follows. We use the tag ti , associated with a set of to-
kens Ki = {k1, . . . ,kl }, to describe a given malware sample x if,
after parsing the detection names for x we find that:
• any of the tokens k ∈ Ki is present for sample x,
• OR any of the synonyms of k is present for the sample (for every
k ∈ Ki ),
• OR any of the children of k is present (for every k ∈ Ki ).
The first bullet refers to the use of a manually created mapping be-
tween tags and tokens, i.e. our original labeling function. The fol-
lowing two bullets define automatic steps for extending the tag def-
initions and improving the stability of the tagging method. Empir-
ically, we observed that when computing the token co-occurrence
statistics in our training set as in Equation 1, the automatic steps
improved the tag coverage in the validation set in average by 13%,
while increasing the mean token redundancy, or the mean number
of tokens observed per tag from 2.9 to 5.8 as shown in Table 2. This
increase in mean token redundancy makes the labeling function
more stable against mis-classifications or missing scans from the
set of trusted vendors. Amore complete analysis of the value of the
automatic extraction step is deferred until Section 5.1. The param-
eter β was set to 0.97, the value at which the coverage of malicious
tags improved for malware samples in our validation set, while re-
maining constant for benign samples. In Appendix C we present a
histogram of empirical pairwise conditional probabilities for pairs
of tokens. The values of conditional probabilities larger than 0.97
are noticeably more common than the ones in the range [0.5,0.97].
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Table 1: An example of how our tags are derived fromdetectionnames frommultiple sources. The first column shows detection
names from nine different vendors, where the valueNone indicates that the vendor has not identified the sample as malicious.
In the second column the tokens parsed and normalized from the detection names are listed. The last column shows the tags
associated with the tokens in the middle column. This association is represented by using the same color in the tokens and
their related tags.
Detection name Parsed tokens Tags
Ares!4A26E203524C, Downloader,
a variant of Win32/Adware.Adposhel.AM.gen,
None, None, None,
Gen:Variant.Razy.260309, None,
Trojan ( 005153df1 ), Riskware/Adposhel
ares, downloader,
variant, win32, adware, adposhel, gen,
gen, variant, razy,
trojan, riskware, adposhel
adware
downloader
W32.Virlock!inf7, TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen,
Trojan ( 004d48ee1 ), Virus:Win32/Nabucur.D,
W32/VirRnsm-F, Virus.Win32.PolyRansom.k,
Win32.Virlock.Gen.8, W32/Virlock.J,
Trojan-FNET!CCD9055108A1,
a variant of Win32/Virlock.J
w32, virlock, inf7, tr, crypt, zpack, gen,
trojan, win32, nabucur,
w32, vir, rnsm, virrnsm, win32, poly, ransom, polyransom,
win32, virlock, gen,
trojan,
variant, win32, virlock
ransomware
packed
file-infector
The tags obtained with this labeling procedure tend to be noisy
because of the “crowd-sourcing” method used in extracting tokens
from multiple sources. Because of this, we refer to samples anno-
tatedwith thismethod asweakly labeled. On the other hand, this la-
beling methodology has the advantage of being cheap to compute
and having high coverage over samples. As long as there is one
of the vendors that names the sample with a detection name, and
that detection name contains a token associated with one of the
previously defined tags, directly or statistically via a parent-child
or synonym token relationship, there will be a label for that sample.
It is also important to note that this labeling technique generates
primarily positive relations: meaning that a tag being present iden-
tifies a relationship between the sample and the tag, but its absence
does not necessarily imply a strong negative relation.
3.2 Tag Creation from Behavioral Information
In order to obtain high quality family name classifications for a set
of samples, we use a proprietary behavioral sandbox environment.
Such a system allows us to execute (detonate) the samples causing
them to expose relevant behaviors such as unpacking and/or down-
loading additional components. Memory dumps, network traffic
packet captures, file read and write operations, as well as many
other activities can be captured that would not necessarily be ob-
servable with a static scan alone, since in its binary state this data
could be encrypted, or possibly not even present (as it may be
downloaded at runtime). On top of this sandbox,malware researchers
can then create family specific signatures that are able to access
these dropped, downloaded, and modified files, as well as memory
dumps, network traffic, and other artifacts. These dynamic signa-
tures provide more accurate classifications than those traditional
AV signatures utilized in static file scanning and have considerably
more stringent criteria to define family membership.
The Salitymalware family, for example, is a parasitic file-infector,
meaning it embeds its malicious code into other clean PE files on
the system. It spreads when any of the infected files are copied to
a different system and executed. Sality uses a system-wide mutex
to determine if another instance of the infection process is already
running. It also uses specific markers to identify already infected
files so as to not to re-infect. A dynamic signature to identify this
family consists on identifying the presence of the unique mutex
or the markers in files that have been opened and modified by the
virus.
Because these sandbox signatures are so specific and do not rely
on circumstantial evidence for family classification, whenever any
of these dynamic family signatures are triggered when executing
a given file, we then know with high confidence that the sample
belongs to the associated family. With this information, we then
keep those samples for which we have positively identified a fam-
ily, and annotate themwith tags that describe their associated mal-
ware family well. Since we are only looking at a set of well defined
malicious families, and basing our detection on very specific be-
haviors, the support of this labeling technique – i.e. the number of
samples for which we generate tag labels – is low and biased to-
wards a specific set of malware types. On the other hand, the tags
generated with this method are considered to be high quality and
can be safely used as ground truth in our analyses.
The family signatures used in this labelingmechanism aremostly
concerned with the actual malware behavior and not necessarily
with the delivery mechanism. For instance, if we are dealing with a
piece of malware that exhibits the behavior of a dropper, the behav-
ioral analysis will focus mostly on characterizing the dropped pay-
load. Because of this, the tags that describe delivery mechanisms
such as installer, packed and dropper are not generated with this
method.
4 TAGS PREDICTION
Once we have defined our labeling scheme, we can define the tag
prediction task as multi-label classification, since zero ormore tags
from the set of T possible tags T = {t1, t2, . . . , tT } can be present
at the same time for a given sample. In order to predict these tags,
we introduce two different neural network architectures, both rep-
resented in Figure 1, which we will refer to asMulti-Head (top) and
Joint Embedding (bottom).
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Figure 1: Using samples and corresponding tagswe train two
neural network architectures to predict malware tags. Top:
Multi-Head architecture, consisting of a base feed-forward
network with one “head” for each tag that it is trained to
predict. Each of the heads is composed of dense layers fol-
lowed by ELU nonlinearities, and a final sigmoid activation
function. Boom: Joint Embeddingmodel, which represents
(embeds) both the binary samples and the malicious tags in
the same low dimensional space. The prediction layer issues
predictions based on the distances between sample embed-
dings and tag embeddings in this space.
The Multi-Head architecture can be thought as an extension of
the network used in [33] to multiple outputs. It consists of a base
topology that is common to the prediction of all tags, and one out-
put (or “head”) per tag. Both parts of the architecture consist of
multiple blocks composed of dropout [37], a dense layer, batch nor-
malization [15], and an exponential linear unit (ELU) activation
function [7]. The only exceptions are the input layer, which does
not use dropout, and the very last layer of each head, which uses
a sigmoid activation unit to compute the predicted probability of
each label.
The Joint Embeddingmodel, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1,
is introduced with the goal of exploiting semantic similarities be-
tween tags. This model maps both the labels (tags) and the binary
file features x to vectors in a joint Euclidean latent space. This em-
bedding of files and tags is performed in a way such that, for a
given similarity function, the transformations of semantically sim-
ilar labels are close to each other, and the embedding of a binary
sample should be close to that of its associated labels in the same
space. This architecture consists on a PE embedding network, a tag
embedding matrix E, and a prediction layer.
The PE embedding network learns a nonlinear function ϕθ (·),
with parameters θ that maps the input binary representation of the
PE executable file x ∈ Rd into a vector h ∈ RD in low dimensional
Euclidean space,
ϕθ (x) : R
d −→ RD .
The tag embedding matrix E ∈ RT×D learns a mapping from a tag
tn ∈ T = {t1, . . . , tT }, to a distributed representation e ∈ R
D in
the joint embedding space,
ϕE (t) : {t1, . . . , tT } −→ R
D
.
In practice, the embedding vector for the tag tn is simply the n-th
row of the embedding matrix, i.e. ϕE (tn) = En . Finally, the pre-
diction layer compares both the tag and the sample embeddings
and produces a similarity score that is run through a sigmoid non-
linearity to estimate the probability that sample x is associated
with tag t for each t ∈ T . In our final model implementation, the
similarity score is the dot product between the embedding vectors.
The output of the network fn (x|θ, E) then becomes,
yˆn = fn (x|θ, E) = σ (〈ϕE (n),ϕθ (x)〉)
= σ (〈En , h〉) , (2)
where σ is the sigmoid activation function, and yˆn is the probabil-
ity estimated by the model of tag tn being a descriptor for x.
We further constrain the embedding vectors for the tags as sug-
gested in [39], such that:
| |En | |2 ≤ C, n = 1, . . . ,T , (3)
which acts as a regularizer for the model. We observed in practice
that this normalization indeed leads to better results on the valida-
tion set. Unless stated differently we fixed the value of C to 1.
We also experimented with constraining the norm of the PE em-
beddings to 1, and analogously using cosine similarity instead of
a dot product as a similarity score between tags’ and files’ embed-
dings. In both cases we observed deteriorated performance on the
test set. This drop in performance was more noticeable for those
samples with multiple tags (more than 4), suggesting that the net-
work is using themagnitude of the PE embedding vector to achieve
high similarity scores for multiple tags concurrently. As part of our
experimentation we also tried to learn the similarity score by con-
catenating together the PE and tag embeddings and running the
resulting vector through some feed forward layers with nonlinear-
ities. However, we found that that the simpler approach of using
dot product was both more effective on the tag prediction task and
more interpretable.
Our goal, for a given PE file, is to learn a distributed, low di-
mensional representation of it, that is “close” to the embedding of
the tags that describe it. The parameters of both embedding func-
tions ϕθ (·) and ϕE (·) are jointly optimized to minimize the binary
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cross-entropy loss for the prediction of each tag via backpropaga-
tion and stochastic gradient descent. The loss function tominimize
for a mini-batch ofM samples becomes:
L = −
1
M
M∑
i=1
T∑
n=1
fn(x
(i ) |θ, E) log(t (i )n )
+ (1 − fn (x
(i ) |θ, E)) log(1 − t (i )n )
= −
1
M
M∑
i=1
T∑
n=1
yˆ
(i )
n log(t
(i )
n ) + (1 − yˆ
(i )
n ) log(1 − t
(i )
n ) (4)
where t (i )n = 1 if sample i is labeled with tag tn , and yˆ
(i )
n is the
probability predicted by the network of that tag being associated
with the i-th sample.
In practice, to get a vector of tag similarities for a given sam-
ple x with PE embedding vector h we multiply the matrix of tag
embeddings E ∈ RT×D by h ∈ RD and scale the output to obtain
a prediction vector yˆ = σ (E · h) ∈ RT , where σ is the element-
wise sigmoid function for transforming the similarity values into
a valid probability value. Each element in yˆ is then the predicted
probability for each tag.
4.1 Evaluation of Tagging Algorithms
There are different ways to evaluate the performance of tagging
algorithms. Particularly, the evaluation can be done in a per-tag or
a per-sample dimension. The former seeks to quantify how well
our tagging algorithm performs on identifying each tag, while the
latter focuses on the quality of the predictions for each sample in-
stead.
In the per-tag case, one suitableway to evaluate the performance
of the model is to measure the area under the receiver operat-
ing characteristic curve (AUC-ROC, or simply AUC) for each of
the tags being predicted. A ROC curve is created by plotting the
true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR). Also,
since the target value for the n-th tag of a given sample is a binary
True/False value (tn ∈ {0, 1}), binary classification evaluation met-
rics such as ‘Accuracy’, ‘Precision’, ‘Recall’, and ‘F-score’ also apply.
To compute these metrics, the output probability prediction needs
to be binarized. For the binarization of our predictions, we choose
a threshold independently for each tag such that the FPR in the
validation set is 0.01 and use the resulting 0/1 predictions. The fact
that our labeling methodology introduces label noise – mostly as-
sociated with negative labels, as pointed out in Section 3 – makes
recall the most adequate of these last four metrics to evaluate our
tagging algorithms, since it ignores incorrect negative labels.
The per-sample evaluation dimension seeks to evaluate the per-
formance of a tagging algorithm for a given sample, across all tags.
Let T (i ) be the set of tags associated with sample i and Tˆ (i ) the set
of tags predicted for the same sample after binarizing the predic-
tions. We can use the Jaccard similarity (or index) J (T (i ), Tˆ (i )) as a
figure of how similar both sets are. Furthermore, let y ∈ {0, 1}T be
the binary target vector for a PE file, where yn indicates whether
the n-th tag applies to the file and yˆ be the binarized prediction
vector from a given tagging model. We define the per-sample ac-
curacy as the percentage of samples for which the target vector is
equal to the prediction vector, i.e., all tags correctly predicted, or,
in other words, the Hamming distance between the two vectors is
zero. For an evaluation dataset withM samples we can use,
Mean Jaccard similarity =
1
M
M∑
i=1
J (T (i ), Tˆ (i ))
=
1
M
M∑
i=1
T (i ) ∩ Tˆ (i )
T (i ) ∪ Tˆ (i )
(5)
Mean per-sample accuracy =
1
M
M∑
i=1
I(y(i ) = yˆ(i )) (6)
as our per-sample performance metrics for the tagging problem,
where I is the indicator function which is 1 if the condition in the
argument is true, and zero otherwise.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We train and evaluate the two proposed model architectures on
the task of malware tagging from static analysis of binary files. In
this section we provide the experimental details of this process:
particularly a description and analysis of the data used for training
and validation along with a definition of the model topology and
training methodology.
5.1 Data Description
For our experiments we collected three datasets ofWindows Portable
Executable (PE) files from a threat intelligence feed, along with
the detection names produced by trusted vendors, first seen time-
stamps, and the number of AV vendors that identify the PEs as
malware.
The first collected dataset is our training set,Dtrain, and contains
7,330,971 unique binary files. All the data inDtrain was obtained by
random sampling of files first observed in our intelligence feed in
the period between 06/20/2017 and 03/02/2018.
Our second dataset – our test set,Dtest – is composed of 1,608,265
unique entries. The samples in the test set were randomly sampled
from all the files whose first seen time was between 03/03/2018
and 06/02/2018. This temporal split between Dtrain and Dtest en-
sures that there is no information leakage between our train and
test sets.
For bothDtrain andDtest we derived the semantic tags following
the procedure described in Section 3.1, using detection names from
10 anti-malware solutions that we consider provide high-quality
names. The set of tokens and mappings used was based only on
detection names from samples in Dtrain, in order to avoid pollut-
ing our time split evaluation. We set α = 0.06% for deciding which
tokens to keep, resulting in 1, 500 unique tokens. We further de-
rived a malicious/benign label for the samples in those sets using
a voting scheme similar to [33], but extended to assign more im-
portance to trusted vendors, and complemented with internal pro-
prietary reputation scores, white and black lists. We refer to the
subset of 1,377,698 malware samples in the test set as Dtest-M and
to the subset of 230,568 benign samples in the test set as Dtest-B .
In addition to the two datasets above, we collected a third dataset
for ground truth evaluation, DGT, containing 7,033 samples from
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the same time period as Dtest. For DGT we obtained a random sam-
pling of files from the time period of interest and used behavioral
traces of the files’ execution to determine their ground truth tags,
following themethodology in 3.2.We only kept in the ground truth
dataset those samples that were positively identified by our behav-
ioral tagging approach, thus minimizing the amount of label noise.
For all the binary files in the three datasets we then extracted
1024-element feature vectors using the same feature representa-
tion as proposed in [33].
Table 2 summarizes the coverage for each of the tags across our
test dataset Dtest. Most of our tags are almost exclusively associ-
ated with malicious samples, except for installer and packed which
are associated with both benign and malicious files. Moreover, we
see that 96% of the malicious samples have tags describing them,
indicating that the labeling approach has effectively a high cover-
age over the set of samples of interest. We also note that the mean
number of tokens observed for each time that a tag appears is 5.57,
which represents the degree of robustness of our labeling strategy
against vendor mis-classifications or missing scans. Synonym and
parent-child relationships used to produce the tags were computed
from the samples in the train dataset. The values in parenthesis in
the table show the labeling statistics had we ignored these rela-
tionships and used only the manual mapping between tokens and
tags. Using both synonym and parent-child relationships derived
from the empirical conditional probabilities of tokens improves not
only the mean token redundancy but also the tag coverage for ma-
licious samples for almost all our tags, leaving unaffected the tags
for benign samples. The coverage statistics for the training set are
similar to the ones presented in the table and not shown here for
space considerations.
We further analyze the distribution and pairwise relationships
of the tags in our training dataset. In Figure 2 we plot the empiri-
cal conditional probability of the tags in the train set computed in
a similar fashion as in Equation 1 by replacing token counts with
tag counts. The value in row i and column j represents the empir-
ical conditional probability of the tag ti given the tag tj , p˜(ti |tj ).
Those rows for which the sum of the elements is higher (packed:
6.1, spyware: 5.4, dropper : 3.9) correspond to tags with a broader
meaning, or higher in a tag hierarchy, and therefore indicative of
more generic tags. Those tags for which the sum of its row is lower
(flooder : 1.0, installer : 1.5, ransomware: 1.5) are tags with more a
more specific meaning. This representation also helps us identify
possible issues with the tagging mechanism as well as understand-
ing the distribution of our tags. Furthermore, we can compare this
matrix with the one derived from the predictions of the model in-
stead of the labels, and have an understanding of the errors that the
model is making, because the elements of both matrices should be
similar.
5.2 Training Details
We trained the two models introduced in Section 4 on the training
dataset Dtrain for 200 epochs using an Adam optimization proce-
dure [17] on mini-batches of 4096 samples and at a learning rate
of 5 · 10−4 using PyTorch [23] as our deep learning framework.
The shared base topology of the Multi-Head architecture con-
sists of an input feed-forward layer of output size 2048, followed by
Table 2: Tag coverage, i.e. percentage of samples annotated
with a given tag, for the weakly labeled dataset Dtest (as
described in Section 5.1) for benign (Dtest-B) and malicious
(Dtest-M) files. The rightmost column indicates the mean
number of different tokens associated with the tag each
time the tag appears across all samples. The last row con-
siders a sample as labeled if any one of the tags is present.
Themean token redundancy for this row corresponds to the
mean of the token redundancies across all tags. Values in
parentheses show the result of the tagging procedure before
exploiting statistical relations between tokens mined from
the training set (cf. Section 3.1.3).
Tag
Benign
Samples
Malware
samples
Mean
token
redundancy
adware < 0.01% 26.5 (22.5) % 5.7 (2.9)
crypto-miner 0% 11.9 (11.2) % 8.8 (4.8)
downloader < 0.01% 32.4 (26.0) % 6.7 (2.8)
dropper 0% 31.9 (27.6) % 4.5 (1.8)
file-infector < 0.01% 32.6 (31.0) % 5.7 (3.1)
flooder 0% 1.3 (1.3) % 5.1 (1.9)
installer 2.2% 11.5 (7.3) % 3.7 (3.3)
packed 3.3% 33.4 (32.5) % 4.2 (2.0)
ransomware 0% 6.6 (6.5) % 5.6 (2.7)
spyware < 0.01% 48.1 (47.6) % 6.6 (3.3)
worm 0% 31.2 (26.7) % 7.5 (3.4)
ANY 5.2 (5.2)% 96.0 (95.4) % 5.8 (2.9)
a batch normalization layer, an ELU nonlinearity and four blocks,
each composed by dropout, a linear layer, batch normalization and
ELU of output sizes 1024, 512, 256 and 128 respectively. Each out-
put head is composed of the same types of basic blocks as are in
the main base architecture, but with output sizes 64, 32 and 1. The
last layer uses a sigmoid non-linearity instead of the ELU. Binary
cross-entropy loss is computed at the output of each head and then
added together to form the final loss.
The Joint Embedding architecture uses the same base topology
as the Multi-Head model but with two extra blocks of output sizes
64 and 32 for the embedding of the PE files into the 32 dimensions
joint latent space. An embedding matrix (E) of learnable parame-
ters with sizeT ×32 is used for the embedding of the tags. We used
dot product to compute the similarity between the PE file embed-
ding and the tag embedding followed by a sigmoid non-linearity
to produce an output probability score. As before, the sum of the
per-tag binary cross-entropy losses is used as the mini-batch loss
during model training.
6 RESULTS
As mentioned in Section 4.1 there are two main dimensions of in-
terest when analyzing the performance of malware tagging algo-
rithm: a per-tag dimension, which evaluates how well each tag is
predicted and a per-sample dimension, which focuses on howmany
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1.00 0.62 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.04 0.68 0.33 0.02 0.17 0.26
0.14 1.00 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.07
0.28 0.74 1.00 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.18
0.34 0.17 0.22 1.00 0.34 0.03 0.06 0.45 0.33 0.49 0.50
0.26 0.38 0.14 0.24 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.64 0.35 0.48
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.27 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.60 0.59 0.46 0.57 0.45 0.55 0.33 1.00 0.66 0.50 0.39
0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.04 0.07
0.35 0.50 0.54 0.69 0.70 0.10 0.07 0.55 0.27 1.00 0.63
0.25 0.30 0.16 0.32 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.22 0.29 1.00
Figure 2: Estimated tag conditional probabilities for our
training set Dtrain. The value of the element in the i-th row
and j-th column represents the empirical conditional prob-
ability of tag i given tag j, p˜(ti |tj ) for our labeling strategy.
samples are correctly predicted and how accurate those predic-
tions are. In the following we analyze the performance of our mod-
els across these dimensions in both our weakly annotated dataset
Dtest-M , and our test set with labeled with ground truth tags DGT.
The evaluation results presented in this section take into consid-
eration only those samples identified as malware by our labeling
scheme. This is because the goal of our current tagging algorithm
is to describe only malicious or potentially unwanted behaviors.
At deployment time, we assume that the tagging models analyze
samples already convicted by a complementarymechanism, and so
we only evaluate on actual malware to resemble this deployment
scenario. Only evaluating in malicious samples also allows us to
compare the results in the test set with those in the ground truth
dataset – which is only composed of malware files. In Appendix
B we complement this results by evaluating the performance on
the entire test set Dtest and show that the models’ performance
does not degrade in the presence of benign samples, meaning that
it does not assign malicious tags to benign samples.
6.1 Per-Tag Results
After training the two proposed architectures we proceed to eval-
uate their performance on the test set Dtest-M . In Figure 3 we com-
pare the per-tag true positive rate (TPR or recall) of both the Multi-
Head and Joint Embedding architectures at a per-tag false positive
rate (FPR) of 1%. In the evaluation for every tag the Joint Embed-
ding architecture outperforms the baseline Multi-Head model, in
some cases, e.g., for spyware, adware and packed, by an important
margin (0.14, 0.15 and 0.18 respectively). We have observed this
trend consistently for other experiments – with different datasets,
layer sizes, and activation functions – that we carried out during
the development of this study.
Table 3 provides amore thorough comparison of these twometh-
ods. Not only does the Joint Embedding model outperform the
baseline in terms of recall for all tokens, but it also does so in
terms of AUC, except for the installer tag, for which the Multi-
Head model performs slightly better. For computing both recall
and F-score we binarized the output using a threshold such that
the FPR in the test set is 1% for each tag. For these two binary
classification metrics, the Joint Embedding model achieves better
performance than the Multi-Head model for every tag (equal for F-
score on the flooder tag). On average the Multi-Head architecture
achieves a recall of 0.72 and a F-score of 0.79 while the proposed
Joint Embedding model achieves a recall of 0.80 and a F-score of
0.84.
Lastly, in the rightmost column of the table we show the eval-
uation results of using the Joint Embedding model trained in our
noisy labeled dataset Dtrain to predict the tags on the ground truth
datasetDGT. Because of how our labeling strategy for DGT was de-
fined, and the behavioral signatures available at the time of com-
piling this work, our ground truth dataset does not have samples
that could be strongly associated with some of the tags, thus the
missing entries in the table. Even though being trained in a dataset
where the tags were extracted in a different manner, we observe
that the evaluation recall on the ground truth dataset is, for most
of the tags comparable, if not better than the evaluation on the test
set Dtest-M . These results imply that the model is effectively learn-
ing to identify high-quality relationships between binary files and
semantic tags even when trained on noisy labels.
6.2 Per-Sample Results
Another way of analyzing our results is to measure the percent-
age of samples for which our models accurately predicted all tags.
We are also interested in knowing how many tags on average (out
of the 11 possible tags) each model correctly predicts per sample.
For this we measure both the Jaccard similarity and the per-sample
accuracy of our predictions according to equations 5 and 6 respec-
tively. Under both metrics the Joint Embedding approach outper-
forms the Multi-Head approach significantly. For the Joint Embed-
ding architecture, the average number of samples for which we
predict all the tags correctly is 58.56% while if we choose a sample
at random, the model correctly predicts the presence (and absence)
of each tag for almost 94% of the tags on average. It is important
to note that, because of the relatively low number of tags per sam-
ple – 2.66 in Dtest-M – the mean Jaccard similarity for a tagging
algorithm that never predicts any tag is 75.8% in this test set. Even
though this baseline is already high, both our tagging models out-
perform it by a large margin, which signals that the models are
effectively learning to identify relationships between tags and bi-
nary feature vectors.
On the ground truth dataset we observe a drop both in the mean
per-sample accuracy and Jaccard similarity for the Joint Embed-
ding model as expected, resulting in 59% of samples for which all
their tags are predicted correctly and a 93.5% of the tags correctly
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Table 3: Per-tag evaluation results for the two proposed architectures on the malware samples of the test and ground truth
evaluation datasets (Dtest-M and DGT respectively). Both recall and F-score are computed by binarizing each classifier’s outputs
at a false positive rate of 10−2 on the test set for every tag. The last column shows the evaluation of the Joint Embeddingmodel
trained with noisy labels on the ground truth evaluation set. The last two rows show the mean and weighted mean for each of
the columns. Theweightedmeanweights the contribution of each tag by its support. The best result between the two proposed
architectures for each row is highlighted in bold.
Multi-Head (Dtest-M) Joint Embedding (Dtest-M) Joint Embedding (DGT)
Tag name AUC
Recall
@FPR=10−2
F-score
@FPR=10−2
AUC
Recall
@FPR=10−2
F-score
@FPR=10−2
AUC Recall F-score
adware 0.9661 0.47 0.63 0.9811 0.63 0.76 - - -
crypto-miner 0.9909 0.85 0.88 0.9970 0.97 0.95 0.9684 0.63 0.63
downloader 0.9552 0.72 0.83 0.9774 0.78 0.87 0.9170 0.99 0.68
dropper 0.9681 0.71 0.82 0.9819 0.80 0.88 - - -
file-infector 0.9824 0.69 0.81 0.9907 0.71 0.82 0.9639 0.83 0.68
flooder 0.9965 0.99 0.72 0.9997 1.0 0.72 - - -
installer 0.9523 0.55 0.68 0.9477 0.57 0.69 - - -
packed 0.9709 0.69 0.80 0.9887 0.87 0.92 - - -
ransomware 0.9907 0.96 0.91 0.9946 0.97 0.92 0.9781 0.86 0.82
spyware 0.9581 0.69 0.81 0.9775 0.83 0.90 0.6311 0.86 0.80
worm 0.9722 0.65 0.78 0.9853 0.67 0.79 0.7438 0.47 0.48
mean 0.9730 0.72 0.79 0.9838 0.80 0.84 0.8670 0.77 0.70
weighted mean 0.9681 0.67 0.79 0.9824 0.77 0.85 0.7677 0.81 0.74
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
TPR (at FPR=0.01)
adware
crypto-miner
downloader
dropper
file-infector
flooder
installer
packed
ransomware
spyware
worm
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Figure 3: Dtest-M per-tag true positive rate (TPR) at a false
positive rate (FPR) of 10−2 for the two proposed models. The
Joint Embedding architecture outperforms the Multi-Head
architecture consistently.
identified per sample. Nevertheless, under both metrics it still out-
performs the Multi-Head model when this last one is evaluated in
the original test set. This second dimension of model evaluation in-
dicates that the relationships learned on the noisy training dataset
are applicable to a more accurately labeled set of samples.
Table 4: Evaluation results for our two proposed architec-
tures on the malicious samples of the test set, Dtest-M. Jac-
card similarity and accuracy are both computed according
to equations 5 and 6 respectively. In both cases the perfor-
mance of the Joint Embedding model outperforms the base-
line by a noticeable margin.
Multi-Head
(Dtest-M)
Joint Embedding
(Dtest-M)
Joint Embedding
(DGT)
Accuracy 0.5228 0.5856 0.5902
Jaccard
Similarity
0.9145 0.9375 0.9354
7 DISCUSSION
Our results from Section 6 suggest that the Joint Embedding is
more suitable for malware tagging than the Multi-Head model ar-
chitecture. Because the PE embedding part of the Joint Embedding
architecture is composed of a similar number and size of layers as
the shared base architecture of the Multi-Head model, the number
of parameters of both neural networks is comparable. Thus, we hy-
pothesize that the performance improvement is due to a more in-
formative internal representation learned by the Joint Embedding
network, which gives it the ability to model, and therefore exploit
tag relationships (labels structure) in the latent space. The number
of parameters for both networks can be expressed as O(B + κT ),
where B represents the number of parameters on the shared base
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and PE embedding topologies, T the number of tags, and κ is the
number of parameters of each head in the Multi-Head architecture
and the latent space dimensionality in the case of the Joint Embed-
ding architecture.
In Section 7.1, we verify that the Joint Embedding model has
learned a proper representation by examining its latent space and
validating that PE file embeddings tend to cluster around their cor-
responding tag embeddings.
7.1 Malware-Tag Joint Embedding Space
In an attempt to validate and understand the latent space learned
by our Joint Embedding model we used t-SNE [38] to reduce the di-
mensionality of the 32-dimensional latent space to a 2-dimensional
representation as shown in Figure 4. In this visualization the small
markers represent the embeddings of PE files in our test setDtest-M .
For each tag, we randomly down-sampled 250 corresponding PE
file embeddings, for a total of 2,750 samples. Large markers corre-
spond to the embeddings of the tags themselves.
As one can see, the embeddings of the PE files labeled with the
same tag tend to cluster together. Furthermore, the embeddings of
the tag labels lie close to the clusters of samples they describe. This
suggests that the Joint Embedding model has effectively learned to
group file representations close to their corresponding tag repre-
sentations, as intended.
This structure in the embedding space is convenient for several
other applications. Tagging can be thought of as a specific case
of information retrieval where we retrieve tags for a given query
sample based on a distance function in latent space. Thus, it would
also be possible to do similarity searches, using one malware sam-
ple to retrieve other samples with similar characteristics by simply
retrieving files whose embedding representations are close to the
representation of the query sample. Finally, such a system can be
applied for information retrieval, where given a combination of
descriptive tags we could obtain a set of samples that are closely
associated with that particular tag combination by mapping it into
the embedding space and retrieving adjacent samples.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paperwe have formalized the concept of describing attributes
of malicious software as a multi-label prediction task, or tagging
problem. Even though the concept of describing malicious artifacts
with descriptive tags is not new, and has been proposed as a way of
eliminating the ambiguity and inaccuracy of relying on signatures
for malware description [18], to the best of our knowledge this is
the first attempt to learn a nonlinear mapping between raw binary
files and descriptive tags for automatic malware characterization.
We have also proposed a simple data-driven semi-automatic ap-
proach for extracting and combining descriptive information of
malware samples from multiple vendors detection names. Further-
more, we evaluated two different approaches to malware descrip-
tion via tagging with deep neural networks, and showed that our
Joint Embedding model can be used to reasonably accurately pre-
dict user interpretable attribute and behavioral descriptions of ma-
licious files from static features, correctly predicting an average
of more than 10.31 out of 11 tag descriptors per sample. Finally we
have shown that the noisy tags extracted from detection names are
t-SNE dim. 1
t-S
NE
 d
im
. 2
Tag
spyware
packed
dropper
downloader
adware
worm
file-infector
ransomware
installer
flooder
crypto-miner
Figure 4: T-SNE visualization of sample and tag (label) em-
beddings for 2,750 samples labeled with a single tag from
Dtest-M (250 randomly selected samples per tag). Largemark-
ers represent tag (label) embeddings while small markers
represent PE samples embeddings. The flooder tag is par-
tially covered by the crypto-miner marker.
a suitable surrogate label for learning tags created through more
expensive behavioral analyses.When evaluating our proposed Joint
Embeddingmodel against ground truth tags for samples belonging
to well known malware families, 10.29 out of the 11 descriptors
were correctly predicted per sample, in average.
We foresee multiple research paths as natural follow-ups to the
ideas proposed in this paper as well of potential applications, such
as malware similarity clustering, and alerts prioritization. We are
also particularly interested in expanding the set of tags used to
describe malware samples to a more complete taxonomy as well
as experimenting with using our ground truth labeled set to fine-
tune model trained with weak labels.
The question of how to reliably and economically create a large
training set suitable for the task is currently the main challenge.
We think it would be also valuable to exploremethods to extend the
set of targets that themodel predicts without the need of retraining
the entire network as well as evaluate this approach in few-shot
and zero-shot learning scenarios.
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A APPENDIX: TAG DEFINITIONS
• Downloader: Malicious program whose primary purpose and
functionality is to download additional content. Often similar
in usage to a Dropper.
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• Dropper: Malicious program that carries another program con-
cealed inside itself, and drops that program onto an infected ma-
chine.
• Ransomware: Malware whose goal is to encrypt or otherwise
make inaccessible a user’s files, to then demand payment to re-
gain access to them.
• Crypto-miner: A program that uses a machine’s computational
resources tomine cryptocurrency, without the user’s knowledge
or consent, sending the results back to a central location.
• Worm: Software that automatically spreads itself.
• Adware: Potentially unwanted software that shows the user an
excessive number of - often in browser - ads, or changes the
user’s home page to an ad, to get more clicks.
• Spyware: Covers programs that collect confidential information
and send it to an attacker. This confidential information could
range from web browsing habits, keystroke logging, password
stealing or banking information among others.
• Flooder: Designed to overload amachine’s network connections.
Servers are common targets of these attacks.
• Packed: Indicates that the malware was packed for the sake of
avoiding detection.
• File-Infector: Infects executable files with the intent to cause per-
manent damage or make them unusable. A file-infecting virus
overwrites code or inserts infected code into a executable file.
• Installer: Installs other unwanted software.
B APPENDIX: FULL EVALUATION RESULTS
In Section 6 we evaluated both our training algorithms the test set
only on samples assumed to be malware by our malware/benign
labeling scheme. In table B.1 we present the results of evaluating
both the Joint Embedding and Multi-Head models on the entire
test set. The fact that there is results of this table are even slightly
better than the ones presented in Table 3 is an indication that the
models perform as expected in benign samples. The mean Jaccard
similarity and accuracy for theMulti-Headmodel in the full test set
are 0.9374 and 0.6378 respectively. For the Joint Embedding model
the mean Jaccard similarity is 0.9598 while the accuracy is 0.7121.
C APPENDIX: TOKENS CONDITIONAL
PROBABILITY
In Figure C.1 we show the histogram of the number of pairs of to-
kens for a given empirical conditional probability value computed
in our training set according to Equation 1 for the range [0.5, 1].
We note that the elbow of the curve in the histogram corresponds
to 0.97, value used for the parameter β to define token relation-
ships in Section 3.1.3. Pairwise conditional probabilities of 1 are
most likely a consequence of our parsing strategy.
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Table B.1: Per-tag evaluation results for the two proposed architectures on the test and ground truth evaluation datasets. Both
recall and F-score are computed by binarizing each classifier’s outputs at a false positive rate of 10−2 on the test set for every tag.
The last two rows show the mean and weighted mean for each of the columns. The weighted mean weights the contribution
of each tag by its support. The best result between the two proposed architectures for each row is highlighted in bold.
Multi-Head (Dtest) Joint Embedding (Dtest) .
Tag name AUC
Recall
@FPR=10−2
F-score
@FPR=10−2
AUC
Recall
@FPR=10−2
F-score
@FPR=10−2
adware 0.9710 0.52 0.67 0.9837 0.66 0.78
crypto-miner 0.9815 0.86 0.88 0.9973 0.98 0.95
downloader 0.9620 0.73 0.83 0.9807 0.79 0.87
dropper 0.9737 0.73 0.83 0.9846 0.83 0.90
file-infector 0.9851 0.73 0.83 0.9923 0.74 0.83
flooder 0.9966 0.99 0.69 0.9997 0.99 0.70
installer 0.9580 0.58 0.69 0.9510 0.59 0.70
packed 0.9759 0.72 0.82 0.9902 0.87 0.92
ransomware 0.9918 0.96 0.90 0.9952 0.97 0.90
spyware 0.9674 0.71 0.82 0.9820 0.84 0.91
worm 0.9770 0.72 0.82 0.9879 0.74 0.84
mean 0.9773 0.75 0.80 0.9859 0.82 0.84
weighted mean 0.9735 0.71 0.81 0.9850 0.80 0.87
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Figure C.1: Histogram of the number of pairs of tokens for a corresponding interval of empirical conditional probabilities. We
note that the elbow of the curve corresponds to the empirical conditional probability interval [0.97, 0.98].
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